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deep is the history of global communications? Deeper, Dwayne Winseck and
Robert Pike argue in Communication and Empire, than the twentieth-century
technologies and systems that are usually highlighted. In a richly layered
and complex history that spans developments in all of the inhabited continents,
Winseck and Pike present a compelling case for tracing the advent of 'deep
and durable' globalization back to the advent of a worldwide network of
cable and telegraph systems in the 1860s. (1)
Histories
of communication focused on the second half of the nineteenth century
are conventionally organised by the conceptual frame of imperialism. That
frame on its own, we are shown in ten chapters, falls short of accounting
for the practices of those who designed, implemented, financed, opposed
and used cable and later wireless networks. Looking for the realisation
of imperialism and national aspirations in communication systems, for
instance, may lead us to miss or downplay the emergence of multinational
companies, cartels and ring agreements that aimed to divide and share
global markets. Further, it may lead us to ignore the agreements that
governments entered into with foreign firms to meet their communication
needs, including the transmission of military and sensitive material.
If anything, Winseck and Pike insist, the globalization of capitalism
had a stronger effect on global communication than imperialism. (40)
Communication
and Empire opens with a much-needed introduction to the individuals,
companies and projects that helped to establish a global telegraph infrastructure
between 1850 and 1870. The complex web of connections described between
individuals such as John Pender, John Brett and Charles T. Bright and
companies such as the Telegraph to India, The British Indian Submarine
Telegraph Company and the Indo-European will test the concentration of
any reader. Fortunately, a summary table is provided on p.30, and the
assembled evidence is clearly directed to show that the development of
a global communications infrastructure was accelerated by the formation
of cartels in and across Britain, Europe and North America, and the privileging
of communication projects in the modernization programs sought in Egypt,
Persia and the Ottoman Empire. Persian threats to build and control the
telegraph bridge between Europe and Britain, for instance, elicited European
investment and political recognition. As chapter two—focused on
the establishment of Euro-American and South American connections—shows,
however, cable infrastructure stripped away much of the insulation between
developing economies and global economic downturns. Further, downturns
offered multinationals and foreign countries opportunities to take over
infrastructure activities that had previously been controlled by states.
Chapter three, dedicated to mapping the underdevelopment of cable systems
in Africa, highlights the main thesis of the book, that the boundaries
of the global cable network were the boundaries of actual or perceived
financial viability, not just imperial control or obligation. This point
is revisited in chapters five and six from the angle of the attempts by
individuals such as Sir Sandford Fleming and John Henniker Heaton, Edward
Sassoon, George Squier and Ernst W. H. von Stephen to introduce state-sponsored
cable systems as accessible and affordable as penny post. Their agitations
had some effect, with companies reducing what were often quite prohibitive
charges for deferred, night and off peak messages. Fine print conditions
such as minimum word charges, though, prevented the widespread take up
of the technology by social users, and irritated staff in press agencies
such as Reuters, Havas, Associated Press and Wolff. Even the rise of rival
wireless technologies at the beginning of the twentieth century did not
spell the end for cable and high prices, for cable companies simply entered
into cartels with wireless companies to control user access and pricing.
On
page 192, Winseck and Pike describe Henniker Heaton's plans for a penny
imperial cable system as a 'true early vision of the internet'. This is
a thought-provoking comparison, and one that might stimulate lively discussion
in the world history classroom. Communication and Empire describes
a world divided and controlled by a small number of multinational companies,
a world in which widespread use of communications technologies was hindered
by price fixing and fine-print conditions. To what extent does this description
apply to the communication infrastructures of our world? Is this a fair
description of our experiences with mobile and internet technologies?
Students in undergraduate and graduate world history classes, for example,
might find it illuminating to conduct research into the global reach of
mobile and internet technologies. Any maps that they locate might be compared
with the frontspiece of Winseck and Pike's book, which shows a clear lack
of provision in what were thought to be the economically unviable areas
of Africa and Siberia. These visual cues can be used to trigger a more
in-depth comparison of communication provision in particular areas, with
students conducting research on one cable or wireless company and one
mobile or internet provider company. A fruitful area of research might
also arise from the search for present-day campaigners for more open or
equitable access to communication technologies.
In
Habermas's view, globalization 'goes deep' when the 'systems world' of
markets, the state and technology connects with the 'life world' of communication,
culture and personal experience. (272) This is also true of historiography.
Global histories have traditionally favoured the analysis of the 'systems
world'. Winseck and Pike aspire to 'go deep', but it is only in pockets
of Communication and Empire, such as their analysis of developments
in China in chapter four, that we gain a sense of how engaging and informative
a combined economic and cultural analysis can be. Both undergraduate and
graduate students will find their account of the struggle both within
China and between China and foreign governments and cable speculators
and forced development through 'build now, ask permission later' developments
at turns both entertaining and sobering. Chapters like this remind us
that historical analysis can only be strengthened through the consideration
of the reception of communication technologies by governments, business
and social users, and aspiring users. How important were cable and wireless
technologies to ordinary people before 1930? Questions like this demonstrate
that the global history of communications can go even deeper.
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